I am sorry to have not known until today the careful article by Giovanni Ferretti “Post-Christians: the challenge of post-theism”, published in the journal Il Regno Attualitá (vol. 69 [2024], pp. 321-333]. It is a critical, but constructive and open, text, written in a respectful tone. And I believe, as does the author, that the issue it addresses is a great challenge for all of us who feel ourselves to be Christians, even if sometimes it is denied that some of us are.
I can only speak on my own behalf, as there is, as far as I know, no organized group of “post-theists.” (I prefer, as I will say later, the term “trans-theist”). And I allow myself to point out the main claims with which I disagree, indicating only the reasons for disagreement:
1. I believe the author falls into a certain contradiction when he says, on the one hand: “the current questioning” of “God’s occasional interventions as a cause among causes in the world (…) does not seem to affect the essential core of traditional Christian theism” (p. 329); but adds immediately that post-ism “deeply contradicts” said essential core of Christianity “when it criticizes the vision of a God separate…, his freedom and personality” (ib.). I wonder: who questions or accepts that it be questioned – as is the case of Ferretti himself, according to what is suggested – said “occasional interventions of God in the world” does not put into question the supposed “freedom” of God to interfere in the unfolding of reality?
Now, if such “freedom” of divine intervention is questioned, there would remain only two alternatives: either God is conceived as a supreme “deistic” entity, external, Aristotelian, ¿personal?, that does not intervene in the world once it has been created, or else God is conceived as immanent to the world, or rather, both immanent and transcendent, even better, beyond immanent-transcendent (and of “personal-impersonal”), in a fundamentally “trans-theistic” register. Indeed, whoever denies that God can intervene as an external physical cause cannot but equally deny that God can intervene by speaking, calling, loving… from the outside, since any action upon the “psyche” or “spirit” of human beings necessarily requires a “physical” support or mediation.
2. I don’t agree with your assessment of “the place that post-Einsteinism attributes to science in theology… to the point of elevating it to a unique source, in any case, a determinant of knowledge even in the theological-religious sphere” (p. 329). “Unique source”? No, not at all; none of the so-called post-Einstein theologians would affirm that. “Determinant”? It depends on what is understood by this term. I would rather say that science is decisive as far as the worldview is concerned, and that this worldview is decisive in relation to the coherence or credibility of theological language.
3. I don’t find her criticism of the “resacralization of nature” consistent or clear. It depends on the meaning given to the term “resacralization” or “sacred” (p. 329). It no longer makes sense to speak of a “sacred” world in opposition to a “profane” world. But neither from the sensitivity of a good portion of contemporary theology nor from biblical and patristic theology do I see why nature, of which humans are a part, cannot be considered a “sacred” reality (freeing the word from its dualistic opposition to “profane”).
4. I believe the reference to the “preferred position that post-theists give to the unitive or fusional mysticism” in opposition to the biblical “relational mysticism” (p. 330) is abusive. In any case, I would say that it is not correct to identify the terms “unitive” and “fusional.” In all “fusions,” two become one, which is not a term applicable to the relationship between God and an entity in the world, since neither one nor two are formed between them. Furthermore, the expression “fusional mysticism” does not appear in any of the authors that Ferretti criticizes, but rather it is a label that the author applies to them.
5. I consider your criticism of the supposed “intention” that would motivate post-Christianity’s “maintaining and valuing, of Christianity, only the essence” to be vague and inaccurate—an essence that would be identified “in the original experience of Jesus lived by the first disciples, as it is scientifically accessible with the current historical-critical method” (p. 331). On the one hand, it does not explain, nor could anyone ever explain, what this “essence” consists of if not by using categories and words; now, no linguistic concept or human image identifies with the “essence” or with the *res*, the reality to which they refer (as Saint Thomas Aquinas already said).
On the other hand, none of the theologians that Ferretti criticizes intends that the “original experience of Jesus” be “scientifically accessible with the historical-critical method.” I, personally, expressly deny it.
6. Your judgment “on the scant attention that post-Einsteinian thinkers pay to the always and exclusively analogical or symbolic character of theological language” (p. 332) strikes me as somewhat surprising, as it seems to assimilate both terms, which are very distinct from each other. As far as I am concerned, I have never used the term *analogical* in relation to statements about God, and I insist on the necessity of a theology radically symbolic or metaphorical.
7. I allow myself to conclude with three observations regarding the section that G. Ferretti dedicates to me in his study:
a) Giovanni Ferretti does not mention, or – I believe – takes into account the book *L’Infinito prima di Dio. In transizione: liberare il misterio divino dalle immagini umane* (Gabrielli Editori, 2024) (original edition in French, *Dieu au-delà du théisme. Esquisses pour une transition théologie, * Éditions Karthala, 2023). Therein, I develop the topic more broadly and systematically from a hermeneutical, historical, philosophical, and theological-Christian perspective.
b) Ferretti points out that my ultimate theological position remains “undetermined” (p. 326). I don’t see how it could be otherwise. To speak of God, we cannot rely on the exact sciences or univocal concepts. Only metaphors can lead us beyond what has been said.
c) As I have indicated above, I use the term “trans-theism” rather than “post-theism.” Overcoming “theism” is not a new doctrine (nor even a new doctrine). Whoever feels comfortable with the traditional “theistic” image of God (which was, logically, the image that Jesus himself held) should feel free to maintain it, but without clinging to it, passing through it, transcending it. Whoever feels moved to exile themselves from that image, let them do so freely, as did Jacob, Moses, Elijah… and Jesus himself to a certain extent, and the mystics/mystesses of all traditions, without clinging to any other alternative image. Thus we continue walking, beyond theism and atheism.
**José Arregi**
www.josearregi.com
English version translated with AI